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THE AFTERMATH OF THORNTON 
Ronald D. Rotunda* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
While term limits on state officials are quite common,l and 
raise no serious federal constitutional problems,z term limits on 
federal legislators are a different matter. In U.S. Term Limits v. 
Thornton3 the Supreme Court, by a narrow 5 to 4 majority, de-
clared unconstitutional an Arkansas law limiting ballot access for 
incumbent U.S. Senators and Representatives after they had 
served two terms (in the case of Senators) or three terms (in the 
case of Representatives). 
What next? In considering the aftermath of Thornton, a pri-
mary question is whether it should be narrowly interpreted. It is 
interesting to note that the Arkansas law was written as a ballot 
access law, not as a permanent disqualification from office. It did 
not incapacitate or prohibit an incumbent from serving in the 
U.S. Senate for a third term after having served two terms; he or 
she was only disqualified from being listed on the ballot. During 
oral argument, counsel for the respondents agreed that the Ar-
kansas law was not a "qualification," an admission that caused 
Justice Stevens to remark: "That's a major concession."4 Conse-
* The Albert E. Jenner, Jr. Professor of Law, University of Illinois. 
1. Over 20 state governors now live with them. Miyazawa v. City of Cincinnati, 825 
F. Supp. 816,821 (S.D. Ohio 1993). Municipal term limits, which date back as far as 1851, 
are in effect in approximately 3,000 American cities, including such major metropolises as 
New York City, Los Angeles, Houston, New Orleans, and Denver. Danielle Farge, Mi-
crocosm of the Movement: Local Term Limits in the United States, 4 U.S. Term Limits 
Outlook Series I & appendix, 1-16 (No.2, Aug. 1995). Term limits on state legislators are 
becoming more common. As of 1994, 16 states imposed term limits on state legislators. 
Mark P. Petracca, Restoring "The University in Rotation": An Essay in Defense of Term 
Limitation, in Edward H. Crane and Roger Pilon, eds., The Politics and Law of Term 
Limits 57, 57 (Cato Institute, 1994). 
2. See, e.g., Legislature of the State of California v. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d 492, 286 Cal. 
Rptr. 283,816 P.2d 1309 (1991) (rejecting free speech and equal protection claims to term 
limits imposed on state legislative officials). 
3. 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995), aff'g sub nom. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Hill, 872 S. W.2d 
349 (Ark. 1994). See Ronald D. Rotunda, Rethinking Term Limits for Federal Legislators 
in Light of the Structure of the Constitution, 73 Or. L. Rev. 561 (1994) (discussing the 
constitutional issues). 
4. U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 63 U.S.L.W. 3451, 3453 (U.S. Dec. 13, 1994). 
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quently, Justice Stevens, who wrote the majority opinion, could 
not simply invalidate the Arkansas law: he had to show that it 
was really a "qualification." He concluded that it was a qualifica-
tion because that was the "true intent" of the people of Arkan-
sas; the law "has the sole purpose of creating additional 
qualifications indirectly. "s 
This intent argument raises interesting questions, particu-
larly if the state has several purposes in mind. For example, if 
another state enacts a ballot access restriction, could a lower 
court (or the Supreme Court) uphold the law as consistent with 
Thornton if the "true intent" is not solely to impose absolute and 
permanent term limits but only to level the playing field between 
incumbents and challengers? 
Justice Stevens' opinion explicitly approved of Storer v. 
Brown,6 which upheld a California law that denied ballot access 
to any Congressional candidate running as an independent if the 
candidate had voted in the most recent party primary or had reg-
istered with a political party during the previous year. Suppose a 
state law, following Storer, provided that a candidate can be 
listed on the ballot for Senator no more than two elections out of 
every three. Or assume that a state law provides that if a two-
term Senate incumbent remains on the ballot for a third consecu-
tive time, then the incumbent's party must also nominate a sec-
ond candidate to run for the same office. The state may be 
expected to argue that its "true purpose" is to level the playing 
field between incumbents and challengers, to give voters more 
choices in candidates, or to compensate for the incumbents' 
greater ability to raise campaign funds and their greater name 
recognition. The state will argue that it did not have the "sole 
purpose of creating additional qualifications." Moreover, both of 
these hypothetical laws affecting ballot access are, like the ballot 
access restriction in Storer (and unlike the law in Thornton), a 
temporary restriction, not a lifetime ban. While Justice Stevens 
did not explain how the Court would rule on this question, the 
way he wrote his opinion, with its reference to "true intent," sug-
gests that Thornton will not end the term limit debate. 
However, I would like to leave to one side the question 
whether Thornton will be narrowly interpreted by later courts. 
Instead, let us focus on probable responses to Thornton even if 
the Court eventually decides to invalidate all ballot access laws 
5. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. at 1871. 
6. 415 u.s. 724 (1974). 
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that may serve to limit congressional terms, even if the law's 
"sole purpose" is not to create "additional qualifications." 
The Thornton majority announced that state efforts to im-
pose term limits on federal legislators are unconstitutional be-
cause-
allowing the several States to adopt term limits for congres-
sional service would effect a fundamental change in the consti-
tutional framework. Any such change must come not by 
legislation adopted either by Congress or by an individual 
State, but rather-as have other important changes in the 
electoral process-through the Amendment procedures set 
forth in Article V.7 
Is it historically correct that "fundamental change in the con-
stitutional framework" must be effected only through the 
Amendment process? Certainly, one obvious response to the 
Supreme Court's decision in Thornton is to lobby for a constitu-
tional amendment, but that alternative, which is always cumber-
some, may not appear to be especially promising in this instance 
because Congress has already considered and rejected that 
option. 
However, history indicates that some amendments are even-
tually accepted even though initially rejected. Let us briefly tum 
to that history and look at two significant ways that the Constitu-
tion has been effectively amended, one dealing with the role of 
the Presidential electors (where there has never been a formal 
amendment) and the other dealing with the direct election of 
U.S. Senators (where a de facto change in the Constitution pre-
ceded what was later formalized as the Seventeenth Amend-
ment). Both examples offer historical insight as to what might 
happen as the term limit debate moves into second gear. 
II. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS 
Technically, we do not vote for the President or Vice Presi-
dent. We vote for electors, who in tum cast ballots for President 
and Vice President. I say "technically" because the modem elec-
tion ballot does not even indicate that one does not really vote 
for Clinton-Gore, or Bush-Quayle. The names of the candidates 
for Presidential electors do not appear on the ballot, they con-
7. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. at 1871 (citation omitted). 
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duct no campaigns, and they are really unknown to the 
electorate.s 
The framers believed that members of the Electoral College, 
unencumbered by the voters' preferences, would exercise their 
judgment to decide who was the best person for the Presidency.9 
The framers foresaw many things, but they did not clearly fore-
see how the Electoral College would operate in practice. Polit-
ical parties quickly developed, and by 1800 the electors began to 
evolve into agents of the political party. The electors were face-
less scriveners whose only real job was to ratify what the voters 
had already decided.w In 1826, Senator Thomas Hart Benton 
acknowledged that the electoral college "has failed" its objective, 
and that this "is a fact of such universal notoriety, that no one 
can dispute it." Moreover, he added: "That it ought to have 
failed, is equally uncontestable; for such independence in the 
electors was wholly incompatible with the safety of the people."11 
There have been rare exceptions over the years, but it has 
long been clear that people expect the electors to act as their 
agents, not as independent decision-makers. For example, elec-
tors pledged for Horace Greeley, the Democratic candidate in 
1872, felt obligated to vote for him even though, by the time of 
the Electoral College vote, Greeley was dead and in his coffin.l2 
In Thomas v. Cohen,l3 a New York court held that an elector 
8. U.S. Const., Art. II, § 1. cl. 2 provides: "Each State shall appoint, in such Man· 
ner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors .... " When our country 
was young, the selection of electors was even more indirect. Some state legislatures di-
rectly chose that state's Presidential electors. In other states the voters chose electors by 
district, rather than the winner-take-all method that is common today. The practice that 
the people voted for the electors did not become a universal practice until 1860. See 
McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 28-29 (1892); Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick, The 
Age of Federalism 692 (Oxford U. Press, 1993); Alfred H. Kelly and Winfred A. Harbison, 
The American Constitution: Its Origins and Development 168 (W. W. Norton & Co., 4th 
ed. 1970). 
9. See, e.g., Federalist 68 (Hamilton) in Jacob E. Cooke, ed., The Federalist 457,459 
(Wesleyan U. Press, 1961); Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United 
States§ 745 (Ronald D. Rotunda and John E. Nowak, eds. 1987) (originally published in 
1833); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 376 n.8 (1963) ("The electoral college was designed 
by men who did not want the election of the President to be left to the people."). 
10. See McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 36 (1892); Kelly and Harbison, American 
Constitution at 135 n.5 (cited in note 8); Albert J. Rosenthal, The Constitution, Congress, 
and Presidential Elections, 67 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 4 (1968). 
11. S. Rep. No. 22, 19th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1826). 
12. Edward S. Corwin, The President: Office and Powers 1787-1984 at 385-86 (Ran-
dall W. Bland, Theodore T. Hindson, and Jack W. Peltason, eds., New York U. Press, 
1984). 
13. 146 Misc. 836,262 N.Y.S. 320 (1933). See also State ex ret. Nebraska Republican 
State Central Committee v. Wait, 92 Neb. 313, 325, 138 N.W. 159, 163 (1912); Johnson v. 
Coyne, 47 S.D. 138, 139, 196 N.W. 492,493 (1923). In Thomas, e.g., the court said: "The 
services performed by the presidential electors to-day are purely ministerial, notwith-
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who pledged to vote for a certain candidate had a legal duty to 
vote for the candidate, and that the court could issue mandamus 
to force the elector to vote as pledged.l4 
Oddly enough, there are some people who are shocked to 
learn that politicians (such as candidates for Presidential elec-
tors) could be forced to keep their promise to the voter, so we 
can find language in other state court decisions arguing that any 
attempt to limit an elector's discretion would violate the U.S. 
Constitution. In 1948, an advisory opinion of the Alabama 
Supreme Court so argued.ls It was no accident that the Alabama 
Court issued its advisory ruling in 1948. It was in that year that 
one of the most important examples of the faithless elector oc-
curred, when all of the duly elected Democratic electors from 
Alabama refused to vote for President Truman, the nominee of 
the Democratic Convention, and instead voted for the Dixiecrat 
candidate. 
Some states, in an effort to prevent a reoccurrence of that 
situation, and to enact common understanding into law, author-
ized the party to require its candidates for electors to pledge to 
vote for the party's nominee. The Alabama Democratic Party, 
after 1948, exercised state delegated authority and required its 
electors to sign a pledge to support the Democratic Party nomi-
nee. In Ray v. Blair,I6 the U.S. Supreme Court held that Ala-
bama could constitutionally permit the party to require 
Democratic electors to pledge to vote for the Democratic nomi-
nee. While upholding the pledge, the majority did not reach the 
question of how it could be enforced, although the dissent explic-
itly assumed that the pledge was legally binding.11 
Blair, in upholding the pledge, acknowledged that the elec-
tors "are not the independent body and superior characters 
which they were intended to be," and they "are not left to the 
exercise of their own judgment."Is The Court thus relied on the 
"long-continued practical interpretation of the constitutional 
standing the language of the Constitution written over 100 years ago. To read that docu-
ment with an eye to the language only ... would mean to hold that our primaries, 
nominating, campaigning, and voting, are empty gestures." 146 Misc. at 842, 262 N.Y.S. 
at 326. 
14. 146 Misc. at 841-42, 262 N.Y.S. at 326. 
15. Opinion of the Justices, No. 87, 250 Ala. 399, 400-01, 34 So. 2d 598, 600 (1948). 
16. 343 u.s. 214 (1952). 
17. Id. at 233 (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("It may be admitted that this law does no 
more than to make a legal obligation of what has been a voluntary general practice."). 
18. Id. at 228 n.l5 (quoting S. Rep. No. 22, 19th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1826)). 
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propriety of an implied or oral pledge of his ballot by a candidate 
for elector .... "19 
Blair is interesting because it illustrates how the Constitu-
tion can, in effect, be amended without enacting a formal amend-
ment that requires electors to be faithful to their pledge. The 
states and the state political parties reached that result without 
ever proposing a constitutional amendment. In the context of 
term limits, states should be able to authorize candidates running 
for federal office to volunteer to take a pledge that they will vote 
for term limits, or serve no more than a set number of terms. A 
state, by analogy to Ray v. Blair, may also be able to authorize a 
political party to require its candidates to pledge to support en-
acting term limits by statute, if elected, and to pledge to person-
ally abide by term limits. 
III. THE ENACTMENT OF THE SEVENTEENTH 
AMENDMENT 
The process leading to the direct election of U.S. Senators 
offers a particularly interesting example of how the Constitution 
was amended de facto prior to the actual ratification of the Sev-
enteenth Amendment. Originally the Constitution provided: 
"The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Sena-
tors from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof, for six 
Years; and each Senator shall have one Vote."zo In 1913, the 
Seventeenth Amendment was ratified: it provided that the voters 
would elect the Senators directly. 
At first blush it might appear to be amazing that the Senate 
joined the House in 1912 in proposing this Amendment. As 
early as 1828, the House of Representatives considered a consti-
tutional amendment to provide for direct election of the Sena-
tors. The House actually voted in favor of such an amendment in 
1893, 1894, 1898, 1900, and 1902.21 Each time, the Senate re-
fused, but in 1912 it finally joined the House. Why would the 
Senators, who had been chosen by their state legislatures, and 
who had previously never supported direct elections, suddenly 
change their minds? 
19. Id. at 229-30. 
20. U.S. Const., Art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (emphasis added). 
21. Kelly and Harbison, American Constitution at 629,631 (cited in note 8). While a 
majority voted in favor of the amendment on each of these dates, the House (prior to 
1912) passed the proposed amendment by the requisite two-thirds majority only in 1893 
and 1902. See George H. Haynes, 1 The Senate of the United States: Its History and Prac-
tice 97 n.1 (Houghton Mifflin Co., 1938). 
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The answer is that by 1912, Senators were already picked by 
direct election in 29 of the 48 states, notwithstanding the lan-
guage of Article I. As Senator William E. Borah said in 1911, in 
support of the Seventeenth Amendment: "I should not have 
been here [in the U.S. Senate] if it [direct election] had not been 
practiced, and I have great affection [for this system)."22 
The story of how U.S. Senators were selected by direct vote 
of people at a time when Article I clearly mandated that the state 
legislatures choose the Senators starts with strong public rejec-
tion of the procedure that provided for selection by the state leg-
islature. When choosing the U.S. Senator, members of the state 
legislatures often were divided. Until this deadlock could be bro-
ken, no Senator was chosen. The State was then deprived of rep-
resentation for a period of time that ranged up to a year or 
more.23 
Election by the state legislatures also made it easier for can-
didates to buy elections, since the number of votes needed to be 
bought were few, and the state legislators voted by open ballot. 
Major corporations paid Senators stipends, and corrupt political 
bosses, who could not win an election by the public at large, 
could more easily win an election by the state legislators.24 
It should be no surprise that the U.S. Senate, the product of 
this corrupt system, would not allow any constitutional amend-
ment to change it. As early as 1874 California and Iowa re-
quested Congress to propose such an amendment, but Congress 
was unmoved.2s In 1893 and in 1902, two-thirds of the House of 
Representatives voted for an amendment providing for direct 
election, but the measure was never even allowed to come to the 
Senate for a vote.26 
The people then turned to primary elections. This "pri-
mary" was not binding in a Constitutional sense, because Article 
I still provided that the state legislature would choose the Sena-
tor. But voters in a party primary could register their choice for 
U.S. Senator, and then urge members of the state legislature of 
that party to vote for the person who won that election.21 It was 
22. 46 Cong. Rec. 2647 (Feb. 16, 1911). 
23. See, e.g., Haynes, 1 The SenaTe at 91-95 (cited in note 21). 
24. See, e.g., Kelly and Harbison, American ConsTituTion at 630-31 (cited in note 8). 
25. Haynes, 1 The SenaTe at 97-98 (cited in note 21). For earlier examples of states 
urging Congress to provide for direct elections of U.S. Senators, see, e.g., Election of 
United States Senators, H.R. Rep. No. 88, 56th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1900); Wilkinson 
Call, S. Doc. No. 236, 55th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 5 (1898) (requesting Congress to pass legisla-
tion ensuring that Senate elections not be left to political forces bribing state legislators). 
26. Haynes, 1 The SenaTe at 96-97 (cited in note 21). 
27. !d. at 99. 
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in the one-party southern states, with strong party discipline, that 
voters, in effect, were actually choosing a Senatorial candidate in 
the special primary election. The state legislators of the domi-
nant Democratic Party would then vote for. the candidate who 
had won the primary.zs 
States that were not one-party states were, initially, less ef-
fective in circumventing the requirements of Article I. More ef-
fective reform began in the western states. In 1904 the people of 
Oregon, by use of the Initiative, created a remedy that would 
allow the virtual direct election of Oregon's Senators. First, the 
voters would pick their party's Senatorial candidates in a pri-
mary. The people would then vote for their Senator by choosing 
among the primary winners at a general election. To make the 
new system work, the voters relied on state legislators taking offi-
cial, state-sanctioned pledges. 
The new state law authorized candidates for the state legisla-
ture to sign one of two pledges. In Pledge Number 1, the candi-
date solemnly pledged to vote-
"for that candidate for United States Senator in Congress who 
has received the highest number of the people's votes for that 
position at the general election next preceding the election of 
a Senator in Congress, without regard to my individual 
preference. ''29 
In Pledge Number 2, the state legislative candidate promised 
that, if elected to the state legislature, to-
"consider the vote of the people for United States Senator ... 
as nothing more than a recommendation, which I shall be at 
liberty to wholly disregard if the reason for so doing seems to 
me to be sufficient. "30 
The Oregon legislature had to choose a U.S. Senator shortly 
following the time when the pledge system went into effect. A 
majority of the state legislators had signed Pledge Number 1, and 
on the first ballot they picked the candidates that the people had 
earlier chosen in the general election. In previous instances, the 
state legislature had often deadlocked for weeks or more. This 
28. Id at 99-100. This procedure was not limited to the one party states, but it was 
less effective in the other states. For example, in 1890 in Illinois, the people in the Demo-
cratic party voted for John M. Palmer, and then the state legislature, controlled by the 
Democrats, selected Palmer. However, the party discipline was not that great, and the 
legislature was still deadlocked for several weeks before accepting the people's choice. 
Id. at 99. 
29. Id. at 101 (emphasis added). 
30. Id. 
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time, the politicians kept their promise and Oregon, in effect, 
avoided and bypassed the Article I requirement that the state 
legislature, not the people should choose Oregon's U.S. Senators. 
Two years later, the Oregon legislature again had to choose 
a U.S. Senator. This time, the people had picked a Democratic 
candidate, but the legislature was Republican. However, nearly 
58% of the legislators had signed Pledge Number 1. The politi-
cians kept their promise: the Republican state legislators 
promptly voted for the Democratic candidate, because they had 
promised to vote for the winner of the election. 
Other states followed Oregon's example, but went even far-
ther. Nebraska required that on the official election ballot, next to 
the names of the candidates for the state legislature, would be 
printed either-
"Promises to vote for people's choice for United States 
Senator" 
Or,-
"Will not promise to vote for people's choice for United States 
Senator."3I 
Additional states copied the Nebraska system. The promise (or 
refusal to promise) was printed right on the ballot, just like the 
candidate's party affiliation is printed on the ballot. Thus, it was 
easy for the voters to know which candidates would promise to 
follow the people's desire for direct election to the U.S. Senate.32 
As early as December 1910, so many states followed the Or-
egon/Nebraska example that 14 of the 30 U.S. Senators whom 
state legislatures were to select at the next election were already 
known, although the state legislatures had not even yet begun to 
convene. In all14 cases, the people had chosen the Senators by 
direct election, and the state legislators had bound themselves to 
respect that choice.33 By 1912, when the Senate finally approved 
the Seventeenth Amendment, about 60% of the Senators were 
already chosen by virtual elections. 
31. !d. at 103 (quoting 1909 Neb. Laws§ 253). 
32. Eventually, the Oregon state constitution required that the state legislature 
choose as U.S. Senator the person whom the people had chosen in the direct election. 
Comment, Garcia, the Seventeenth Amendment, and the Role of the Supreme Court in 
Defending Federalism, 10 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol. 189, 208 (1987). 
33. Haynes, 1 The Senate at 104 (cited in note 21) (citing Boston Herald (Dec. 26, 
1910)). 
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The experience with Presidential electors and the Seven-
teenth Amendment is useful in analyzing what might happen to 
the term limit movement. First, the fact that Congress has not 
yet proposed a constitutional amendment to mandate term limits 
does not mean that the dispute is over. Recall that the first effort 
to propose a constitutional amendment providing for the direct 
election of U.S. Senators was in 1828. Even though the people 
supported direct election of Senators by very high margins (rival-
ing the large margins favoring term limits), it took many years to 
persuade Congress to propose such an amendment. The effort to 
amend the Constitution is not a race for the short-winded. 
Moreover, failure to amend the Constitution does not mean 
that reform is impossible. The Electoral College still exists, even 
though it is almost an historical curiosity. The names of the Pres-
idential candidates, not the electors, are now on the ballots. 
Some states now require electors to promise to vote for the can-
didate to whom they are pledged. The faithless elector is a rare, 
if not extinct, phenomenon, held in disregard. "Faithless," after 
all, is a pejorative word. 
Years before there was a Seventeenth Amendment provid-
ing for direct election of U.S. Senators, many states provided for 
an election, and then required that a statement be placed directly 
on the ballot indicating whether the state legislative candidate 
would automatically follow the choice that the voters had made 
in a direct election for Senator. We should expect term limit pro-
ponents to lobby for similar statements on the ballot for U.S. 
Representative and Senator. Does the candidate pledge to vote 
for a federal statute and Constitutional Amendment favoring 
term limits? Does the candidate pledge to abide by term limits? 
There is nothing unconstitutional or even unusual about 
placing such information on the ballot.34 Ballots have listed 
party membership for years and the experience of the Progres-
sives and their push for the Seventeenth Amendment during the 
early part of this century demonstrates that pledges are also ap-
propriately placed on the ballot. Like the requirement that the 
ballot list the name of the Presidential candidate (rather than the 
34. The only case where the Supreme Court has prevented the state from placing 
information about a candidate on the ballot is when the state violates the equal protection 
clause and places the race of the candidate on the ballot in order "to require or encourage 
its voters to discriminate upon the grounds of race." Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 
402 (1964) (state may not require that nomination papers and ballots designate the race 
of the candidate for elective office). 
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name of the anonymous electors pledged to him), the require-
ment that the pledge be on the ballot simply makes easier the 
voter's job of determining where the candidate stands. Voters 
then can always cast their ballots against (or for) the candidate 
who supports term limits. 
